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1. Overview 
Examples of digital approaches to monitoring staff absenteeism were difficult to find in the 
literature within the scope of this review. There was a sense from experts consulted that 
monitoring attendance may well be going on alongside other mhealth and ehealth interventions.  
Research looking at the use of smartphones to monitor doctor attendance in Pakistan found 
many other factors affecting attendance other than the monitoring (Callen et al 2013). Health 
systems inspectors uploaded results to an aggregating website. Smartphone monitoring doubled 
inspection rates and relatively few phones were used to cover a large population. Because 
politicians provide public jobs, doctors were found to be considerably more likely to be present at 
work in competitive constituencies.  
A system in India which electronically transmits time and date stamps to monitor nurse absence 
found that incentives were required alongside the monitoring for effective change (Banerjee et al 
2008). There were problems with staff being excused for meetings which could not be proven 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, 2009). Machines were also found to be deliberately 
broken. 
2 
One example from the field of education is widely cited in the literature. An experiment was 
conducted in a remote rural area in India where regular monitoring is difficult. Children were 
instructed to take photos of teachers with cameras (Duflo & Hanna, 2005). The cameras had 
tamperproof date and time functions. The program was found to be effective compared to a 
control with 22 percent absence in treatment schools and 42 percent absence in comparison 
schools. Test scores were also higher in the treatments schools.  
An article on digital crowdsourcing in the agricultural sector is included in section 3 (Rezaee et al, 
2015). It is not an example of monitoring for absenteeism but shows the potential of digital 
approaches to crowdsource information. Crowdsourcing can be used to monitor absenteeism 
(Deussom et al., 2012). 
Labrique et al (2013) emphasises that mhealth solutions should have multiple functions. Mobiles 
for Quality Improvement in Uganda is an example of technology use for health management 
which could be used as a platform for also monitoring absenteeism. Process and software tools 
were established to improve provider performance improving adherence to clinical protocols 
(Riley & BonTempo, 2011). User feedback platforms could also be used for monitoring absence 
(see MeTA 2014 as an example of a feedback platform).  
Research on teacher absence (without the use of technology) does caution that the presence of 
teachers does not necessarily mean teachers are working (Chaudhury et al 2006). Digital 
solutions should measure performance also. 
2. Key papers 
The Political Economy of Public Employee Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan 
Callen M, Gulzarz S, Hasanain A & Khan Y. (2013). University of California, San Diego. 
https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/909%20Political%20Economy%2
0of%20Public%20Employee%20Absence%20in%20Pakistan%20Feb2014.pdf  
In many developing countries, public sector absence is both common and resistant to reform. 
One explanation for this is that politicians provide public jobs with limited work requirements as 
patronage. The authors test this patronage hypothesis in Pakistan using: (i) a randomised 
controlled evaluation of a novel smartphone absence monitoring technology; (ii) data on election 
outcomes in the 240 constituencies where the experiment took place; (iii) attendance recorded 
during unannounced visits and; (iv) surveys of connections between local politicians and health 
staff. Four results support this view. First, while doctors are present at 42 percent of clinics in 
competitive constituencies, they are present at only 13 percent of clinics in uncompetitive 
constituencies. Second, doctors who know their local parliamentarian personally are present at 
an average of 0.727 of three unannounced visits, while doctors without this connection are 
present at 1.309 of the three visits. Third, around 40 percent of inspectors and health 
administrators report interference by politicians when they try to sanction doctors. Fourth, the 
effect of the smartphone monitoring technology, which almost doubled inspection rates, is highly 
localised to competitive constituencies. Last, evidence of program impact is found in part due to 
the transmission of information to senior officers. This is tested by manipulating the salience of 
staff absence in data presented to officials using an online dashboard. These effects are also 
largest in politically competitive constituencies. These results have implications for the study of 
bureaucratic incentives in fragile states and are potentially actionable for policymakers trying to 
build state capacity. 
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Details of the digital technology: 
The smartphone monitoring system required only 90 smart phones to implement and more than 
doubled health inspections in half of the Punjab Province (with a population the size of 
Germany). The smartphone-based solution implemented allows health system inspectors to 
upload the results of their assigned visit to a basic health facility to an aggregating website 
(dashboard), which instantly updates reports at different levels of aggregation (zonal and 
provincial) with the information captured by this most recent visit. The “Monitoring the Monitors” 
program replaced the traditional paper-based monitoring system, which collects data on facility 
utilisation, resource availability, and worker absence, with an android-based smartphone 
application. Data are transmitted to a central database using a General Packet Radio Service 
(GPRS) in real time. Data are then aggregated and summary statistics, charts, and graphs are 
presented in a format designed in collaboration with senior health officials. That data are: (i) 
aggregated in the province in real time; (ii) geo-tagged, time-stamped, and complemented with 
facility staff photos to check for reliability; and (iii) available in real time to district and provincial 
officers through an online dashboard. Application development started in August 2011. After 
developing the application and linking it to a beta version of the online dashboard, the system 
was piloted in the district of Khanewal.  
Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System 
Banerjee A, Duflo E, and Glennerster R. (2008). Banerjee, A. V., Duflo, E., & Glennerster, R. 
(2008). Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2‐3), 487-500. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2826809/ 
This paper reports the results of a randomised evaluation of a program implemented 
collaboratively by Seva Mandir, a leading NGO, and the health administration of the State of 
Rajasthan and of the district of Udaipur, to improve the attendance of nurses in sub-centres and 
aid-posts. Under the program, Seva Mandir manages a system for monitoring nurses using time 
and date stamps, and transmits the information to the government, which is then supposed to 
use the information to provide incentives to nurses (a specific scheduled of fines and punishment 
was introduced). The first result of this evaluation was that as long the incentives were effectively 
in place (as in the first 6 months of the program), they lead to a dramatic improvement in 
attendance (a doubling by some measures). However, after the first six months the health 
administration deliberately undermined the incentive system, with the result that 16 months after 
the start of the program, there was no difference between the presence rate in treatment and 
comparison centres—both were extremely low (below 40%). These results show that, just like 
informal school teachers, nurses are responsive to properly-administered incentives. They also 
show that making the nurses come to work is not a priority for the local health administration and 
that incentive systems get undermined quickly if there is no sufficient political will to enforce 
them. This suggests that pouring more money into the system as it stands, which is what is 
currently planned, will not solve the underlying problem. 
 
Showing Up is the First Step. Addressing Provider Absence in Education and Health  
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (2009) MIT 
https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/Showing%20Up%20is%20the%2
0First%20Step.pdf 
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Seva Mandir installed date and time-stamping machines in clinics in Udaipur, India to monitor 
nurses and help local government officials implement incentives for nurses’ attendance. Absent 
nurses would be paid less and could be fired. However, absences for legitimate reasons such as 
meetings could be “excused” by supervisors. Research finds that, for the first few months, the 
program increased attendance. However, the program’s effectiveness quickly degenerated. 
Nurses deliberately broke several machines. Moreover, supervisors substantially increased the 
number of absences they excused—even on days when no meetings were held and no 
legitimate excuses were available. By failing to abide by the machine’s monitoring, supervisors 
undercut the program. The effect of the program dissipated; nurses in the incentive group were 
soon absent as frequently as those in the comparison group. 
 
Monitoring works: getting teachers to come to school 
Duflo E & Hanna R. (2005). NBER Working Paper No.11880.  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11880.pdf 
In the rural areas of developing countries, teacher absence is a widespread problem. It has been 
argued that teachers fail to attend school because neither their principal nor the beneficiary has 
the capacity to both effectively monitor and penalise absence. The principals, usually 
governments (but also NGOs), have the power to penalise absences, but, being far removed, 
may not be able to effectively monitor attendance. As such, they often lack the information 
needed to enforce attendance rules. The community can effectively monitor attendance, but it 
often lacks the power to penalise absence. One solution—championed by many, including the 
2004 World Development Report— is to expand community control by improving community-
based monitoring; strengthening the flow of information between the community and the 
principal; involving the community in decisions to hire, fire, and pay teachers; or transferring 
wholesome control of teachers to the community. However, evidence from a variety of contexts 
suggests that community control interventions have not been particularly effective at reducing 
absence. There is limited evidence that external control, coupled with a clear and credible threat 
of punishment, may be more effective at inducing “good” behaviour. 
This paper tests whether a simple incentive program based on teacher presence can reduce 
teacher absence, and whether it has the potential to lead to more teaching activities and better 
learning. In 60 informal one-teacher schools in rural India, randomly chosen out of 120 (the 
treatment schools), a financial incentive program was initiated to reduce absenteeism. The 
location, Udaipur, is a sparsely populated, hilly region where villages are often remote and hard 
to reach, making regular monitoring of the NFEs difficult. Teachers were given a camera with a 
tamperproof date and time function, along with instructions to have one of the children 
photograph the teacher and other students at the beginning and end of the school day. The time 
and date stamps on the photographs were used to track teacher attendance. A teacher's salary 
was a direct function of his attendance. The remaining 60 schools served as comparison 
schools.  
The introduction of the program resulted in an immediate decline in teacher absence. The 
absence rate (measured using unannounced visits both in treatment and comparison schools) 
changed from an average of 42 percent in the comparison schools to 22 percent in the treatment 
schools. That absence rates stayed low after the end of the (proper) evaluation phase implies 
that the effect was not due to a Hawthorne Effect—namely, teachers did not change their 
behaviour simply for the experiment. When the schools were open, teachers were as likely to be 
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teaching in both types of schools, and the number of students present was roughly the same. 
The program positively affected child achievement levels: a year after the start of the program, 
test scores in program schools were 0.17 standard deviations higher than in the comparison 
schools and children were 40 percent more likely to be admitted into regular schools.  
The findings suggest that external monitoring coupled with simple, direct incentives may also be 
used to reduce absence among providers of other services essential to development, such as 
health, in rural areas where the need is the greatest and absence is most prevalent. 
This paper is on the same experiment. It is published more recently but offers no new 
conclusions:  
Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school  
Duflo E, Hanna R, & Rya SP. (2012). The American Economic Review, 102(4), 1241-1278. 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/5582  
3. Further references 
Holding Health Workers Accountable: Governance Approaches to Reducing Absenteeism 
Deussom R, Jaskiewicz W, Dwyer S and Tulenko K. (2012). CapacityPlus. 
http://www.intrahealth.org/files/media/holding-health-workers-accountable-governance-
approaches-to-reducing-absenteeism/holding-health-workers-accountable-governance-
approaches-reducing-absenteeism.pdf  
 
Health workers or communities can use mobile phones with SMS texting capabilities to 
encourage reporting the presence or absence of health workers, in addition to facility standards, 
patient waiting times, availability of medicines, and other quality or productivity indicators. Such 
crowdsourcing applications have the potential to provide managers and health workers with 
quantitative and qualitative information to develop action plans to address productivity (and/or 
quality) issues, such as absenteeism. Crowdsourcing can also empower communities to engage 
with the health system and hold it accountable to meet minimum quality and access standards 
for service delivery. Anonymous mobile-phone surveys, toll-free phone lines, or e-mail addresses 
provide outlets of communication for health workers to describe their work environment and 
housing conditions, make anonymous reports of absent colleagues or cases of harassment, or 
bring attention to other related components of their work climate. This can be effective, assuming 
that managers respond in a timely and confidential manner. 
 
 
Crowdsourcing government accountability: Experimental evidence from Pakistan 
Rezaee A, Hasanain A, & Khan Y. (2015). International Growth Centre, Working Paper S-37307-
PAK-1.  http://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Hasanain-et-al-2015-Working-paper-
1.pdf 
 
The researchers designed and implemented an information clearinghouse to reduce government 
agent shirking in a context fraught with asymmetric information: agricultural service provision in 
the developing world. The clearinghouse provides citizens in rural Punjab, Pakistan with 
government veterinarians’ success rates at artificially inseminating livestock, an objective 
measure of veterinarian effort. It gathers and disseminates locally relevant information from a 
large 2 base of farmers automatically, in real time, using a call centre. The clearinghouse model 
stands in contrast to government monitoring schemes that provide information to agents’ 
superiors, relying on the “long route” of accountability in which citizens must influence 
policymakers to improve service provision. It approaches the problem more directly; it 
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strengthens the “short route” of accountability by increasing citizens’ direct power over 
government agents. 
 
 
mHealth innovations as health system strengthening tools: 12 common applications and a 
visual framework 
Labrique AB, Vasudevan L, Kochi E, Fabricant R, & Mehl G. (2013). Global Health: Science and 
Practice, 1(2), 160-171. 
http://www.ghspjournal.org/content/1/2/160.full.pdf  
 
Rather than being perceived as siloed, standalone solutions, mHealth strategies should be 
viewed as integrable systems that should fit into existing health system functions and 
complement the health system goals of: health service provision; a well-performing health 
workforce; a functioning health information system; cost-effective use of medical products, 
vaccines, and technologies; and accountability and governance. 
 
 
Mobiles for Quality Improvement Pilot in Uganda 
Riley P and BonTempo J. (2011) Bethesda, MD: Strengthening Health Outcomes through 
the Private Sector Project, Abt Associates Inc. 
http://www.shopsproject.org/sites/default/files/resources/SHOPS%20m4QI%20Uganda%20Pilot
%20Report.pdf 
 
The objectives of Mobiles for Quality Improvement (m4QI) were to develop and test a 
technology-supported approach to performance improvement including processes for identifying 
performance gaps in adherence to clinical protocols, a platform to manage and automate the 
delivery and receipt of text message reminders and quizzes to address the gaps, and production 
of actionable data to improve effectiveness of supportive supervision and follow-up. To support 
scalability and replicability, the pilot platform was designed for users of low-end phones, and 
those without Internet access. 
 
A pilot was carried out in Uganda. The process and software tool for improving provider 
performance was established. Messages were successfully sent and received although technical 
issues resulted in intermittent periods of non-delivery. Participants reported changes in 
knowledge, practice, and motivation. There was also increased team interaction on issues 
related to quality of service. 
 
 
Governing through the phone: How policymakers can leverage ICT to improve 
governance outcomes 
Hasanain A. (2016) Global Economic Governance Programme 
http://globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/GEG%20Hasanain%20July%202016.pdf  
  
Drawing on examples from countries around the world, this policy brief provides illustrations of 
the ways that ICT interventions can improve governance such as:  
1) Improving monitoring of staff performance and auditing of service delivery by 
governments departments, and in election monitoring for institution-building 
2) Disseminating information to citizens, for example about emergency services during 
disaster-relief work and on agricultural extension services to farmers, and disseminating 
technical knowledge and training to government officials through online courses. 
 
The Punjab province of Pakistan is home to more than 100 million people, spread over an area 
approximately equal to England and Ireland combined. Staff for various government departments 
are located in dispersed locations across the province, with relatively little oversight of local 
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officials by senior bureaucrats in the provincial capital. In 2011, the provincial health department 
collaborated with researchers to pilot a smartphone-based system that replaced the paper-based 
monitoring of facilities with data entry using smartphones. This system instantly transmitted the 
data it gathered to a website that updated detailed statistics and graphs using that data. This 
information became available to senior government officials, who were able to use it to provide 
feedback to local staff. As a result, staff performance on certain metrics doubled in many areas. 
 
The low resolution screen shot below extracted from this brief shows a graph of the percentage 
of facilities where the medical officer was not available during a random visit as an example.  
 
The brief notes the importance of ensuring the veracity of data. The presentation of the data can 
affect interpretation. ICT interventions can go wrong when context is ignored and there is a lack 
of underlying demand for reform.  
 
A famous early example of an ICT-based reform effort that failed was a nurse attendance 
monitoring system set up in Udaipur in Rajasthan, India (see Banerjee et al., 2008, section 2). A 
lack of senior bureaucrats’ desire for reform meant that a technical solution could not survive for 
long. Similarly, the case of health official monitoring in Punjab, Pakistan, described how an ICT-
based intervention yielded a doubling of certain metrics. The caveat however, is that this impact 
was localised to constituencies with competitive politics, and yielded no impact elsewhere. Both 
of these cases can be interpreted to make a more general and simple conclusion: technology-
based reforms can be very powerful, but only if there is an underlying human demand for 
change. 
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Client Satisfaction with Services in UGANDA’s Public Health Facilities. A Study by the 
Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA), Uganda 
MeTA (2014) UNHCO 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21905en/s21905en.pdf  
 
Health service clients were polled via U-Report, a new mobile phone-based technology 
developed by UNICEF Uganda. Through a series of short questions sent by SMS, U-report 
enables citizens to provide real-time feedback from across Uganda, allowing for improved 
governance, accountability and transparency in health centers. Some respondents reported on 
staff absence.  
 
Digital technology for health sector governance in low and middle income countries: a 
scoping review 
Holeman I, Cookson TP, & Pagliari C. (2016). Journal of Global Health, 6(2). 
http://www.jogh.org/documents/issue201602/jogh-06-020408.pdf  
 
This paper refers to monitoring staff absence as one of the purposes of digital technology in 
health. The paper notes that automation and auditing may help to address inappropriate 
practices by taking processes or decisions out of the hands of individual health care personnel 
and intermediaries. For example, new algorithms can automatically detect “outlier” data sets that 
show signs of having been faked by an absentee worker rather than having emerged from a 
genuine patient encounter.  
 
 
Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries 
Chaudhury N, Hammer J, Kremer M, Muralidharan K and Halsey Rogers F. (2006) Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 20 (1).  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPUBSERV/Resources/477250-
1187034401048/ChaudhuryandothersMIA.pdf  
 
This paper reports results from a survey in which enumerators made unannounced visits to 
primary schools and health clinics in Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Uganda 
and recorded whether they found teachers and health workers in the facilities. The investigators 
recorded absence as well as whether workers present were actually working. Around one-half of 
teachers who were present at work were found not to be working. 
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